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Abstract—Imagine when you line up in a store, the person in front of you can make you pay her bill by using a passive wearable
device that forces a scan of your credit card without your awareness. An important assumption of today’s Near-field Communication
(NFC) enabled cards is the limited communication range between the commercial reader and the NFC cards – a distance below 5 cm.
Previous approaches to attacking this assumption effectively use mobile phones and active relays to enlarge the communication range,
in order to attack the NFC cards. However, these approaches require a power supply at the adversary side, and can be easily localized
when mobile phones or active relays transmit NFC signals.
We propose ReCoil, a system that uses wearable passive relays to attack NFC cards by expanding the communication range to 49.6
centimeters, a ten-fold improvement over its intended commercial distance. ReCoil is a magnetically coupled resonant wireless power
transfer system, which optimizes the energy transfer by searching the optimal geometry parameters. Specifically, we first narrow down
the feasible area reasonably and design the ReCoil-Ant Colony Algorithm such that the relays absorb the maximum energy from the
reader. In order to reroute the signal to pass over the surface of human body, we then design a half waist band by carefully analyzing
the impact of the distance and orientation between two coils on the mutual inductance. Then, three more coils are added to the system
to keep enlarging the communication range. Finally, extensive experiment results validate our analysis, showing that our passive relays
composed of common copper wires and tunable capacitors expand the range of NFC attacks to 49.6 centimeters.
Index Terms—Near-field communication, passive relay, magnetically coupled resonant wireless power transfer, attack.
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1 INTRODUCTION
IMAGINE you are waiting in line at your favorite store,but unbeknownst to you, you just paid for the person in
front of you. And, the person in front of you achieved this
without any active electronics, making her attack virtually
untraceable and (technically) FCC compliant [1]! Recent
years have witnessed a proliferation of Near-field Commu-
nication (NFC) for secure and efficient communication in the
Internet of Things. NFC works at the frequency 13.56 MHz
defined by the standard ISO/IEC 14443 [2] and allows in-
expensive battery-free tags to communicate wirelessly with
powered readers over extremely short range (5 centimeters
at most). In principle, NFC limits the maximum communica-
tion distance between the tag and reader to extremely close
distances – an attractive security guarantee [3], [4]. Indeed,
NFC has seen wide adoption for secure battery-free systems
such as payment cards and identity (ID) cards.
However, recent studies have revealed several weak-
nesses of the NFC framework [5], [6], [7], [8], [9]. Malicious
software on cellphones can exploit bugs in the Android
NFC Stack or browser to attack NFC Services. For instance,
infected phones close to contactless cards can surreptitiously
read their information. More recent novel work has demon-
strated using active relays to attack NFC cards [10], [11],
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Fig. 1: The ReCoil scenario.
[12]. A smartphone or a circuit board with Android SDK API
can serve as a man-in-the-middle, that relay signals from the
NFC tag to the reader, violating the proximity assumption
NFC communications.
In this paper, we build ReCoil – that, to our knowledge,
provides the first completely passive attack on NFC appli-
cations. Passive relays are adopted due to the following
reasons: 1) our device is totally composed of copper wires
and capacitors, making the system a low-cost and low-
consumption one. 2) We design a wearable device which
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2can be totally shielded by clothing or equipment that the
attacker carries. Without power supply and active NFC
reader, it is more possible for the attacker to attack the
victim stealthily and secretly. 3) Since we do not revise
the commercial protocols of NFC, our device is hard to
detect. We allow NFC cards to be read at obover ten times
their normal communication range using an array of passive
relays that are thin, light-weight and small (readily shielded
by clothing). These passive relays equipped with variable
capacitors can steer near-field signal to provide maximized
power to the NFC cards over further distances. A detailed
experimental evaluation on commercial NFC readers and
cards shows that we can relay query signals and responses
between them over distances of 49.6 centimeters, under the
environment shown as Fig. 1, against the advertised range
limit of 5 centimeters.
Our core contribution is providing a near-field passive
solution to maximize the output power to the NFC cards.
Since the NFC tag is a purely batteryless device, ReCoil
fully relies on the energy delivered wirelessly by a nearby
NFC reader. Without additional power supply, it enlarges
the communication range only by judiciously regulating the
geometry parameters of the coils to obtain an optimized
performance of the passive relays. This is complicated due
to the fact that the distance and orientation among these
coil relays can easily affect the mutual inductance between
any two adjacent coils, resulting in a changed resonance
frequency and downgraded performance. Therefore, it is
important to optimize the design and geometry of the
coils to maximize the energy transfer between the passive
relays. ReCoil achieves this by carefully studying the induc-
tance of the copper coils, through extensive modulations,
simulations and experimentation. We first study varying
shapes of the coils and show that square coils have bet-
ter performance than other antennas. We then formulate
an optimization problem to maximize the output power
and compute the optimal parameters of the passive coils.
Since non-linear solvers usually converge to sub-optimal
local maxima, we design the ReCoil-Ant Colony Algorithm
(RACA) to randomly initiate the beginning parameters and
find the optimal geometry parameters which maximize the
output power.
A second challenge that ReCoil addresses is to reroute
the signal to pass over the surface of the human body
because the signal is too weak to go through the human
body directly. We build a Magnetically Coupled Resonant
- Wireless Power Transfer (MCR-WPT) system to mitigate
this challenge. Our design is a wearable waistband that sur-
rounds the body and therefore mitigates its attenuation of
the NFC signal when attacking the targetted NFC card. We
add three more coils which are hidden in a backpack to keep
the signal transmission. We then describe how the location
of the coils can be optimized to maximize coupling between
the NFC transmitter-receiver pair over extended distances.
We further adapt the resonant frequency of the coils to the
frequency of NFC signal by tuning the capacitor attached
to the coils. A key challenge in ensuring the optimized
energy transfer is the impact of objects between the relay
and transmitter-received pair – the body and clothing of
the attacker. When the attack device is attached on human
body, the resonated frequency can be affected by compli-
cated environment. Thus, we first perform experiments to
shield coils from metallic materials on clothes by building
a Ferrite sheet and model its impact. Further, our results in
multipath-rich settings show that our system can still work
at complicated environment in a robust manner.
We implement ReCoil as a light-weight multi-coil array
that can be firmly worn on human bodies. We use Adafruit
PN532 which has micropower as the commercial reader,
making ReCoil a typical power-limited system. AWG 18
copper wires and variable capacitors are used to create
the coils and apply intended phase shift. Based on the
analysis and models, we use the High Frequency Structure
Simulator (HFSS) to simulate and validate the performance
of the passive coil relays by changing the corresponding
orientation and separation. Based on these simulations and
experimentation, we design the optimal dimension, distance
and orientation of coils, achieving the optimal communica-
tion range. The results from our testbed show:
1) a distance of 49.6 cm in accessing other people’s NFC
cards, ten times that of the existing NFC systems.
2) robustness when attacking the NFC cards under multi-
path over a distance of 48 cm.
3) successful attack over multiple NFC cards.
4) a practical deployment compatible with commercial
NFC-based smartphones.
Contributions: We propose a novel system attacks the
proximity-assumption of NFC using passive multi-coil re-
lays. We design the optimal dimension, separation and
orientation of these coils. Our system achieves extending the
range of NFC cards successfully over distances of to 49.6 cm
with negligible increase in latency.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sec. 2,
we discuss related work on attacking NFC, passive relays
design and how to detect potential attacks. NFC principles
and the MCR-WPT model are introduced in Sec. 3. Attack
model, key challenges and solutions are explained in Sec. 4.
Sec. 5 proposes our system design, mainly focusing on
our algorithm and coil design. We implement ReCoil in
Sec. 6 and conduct extensive evaluations in Sec. 7. Then,
we discuss the limitations of our system and future work in
Sec. 8. Sec. 9 concludes the paper.
2 RELATED WORK
Active Attacks in NFC: Though NFC has limited communi-
cation range to guarantee the security of payments, there has
been much work on active NFC relay hacking [13]. Much
novel work increased the NFC range by the relay attack
using smartphones [6], [14] or active relays [10], [11], [15]
that amplify and forward NFC signals. Active NFC-enabled
devices effectively increase the hacking range to 1.5 meters
[16], with increased power consumption and hardware cost.
Other work also focused on NFC eavesdropping [17], [18].
The eavesdropping range of magnetic field using passive
NFC was first evaluated in [19], and a more powerful reader
was designed to increase the communication range by 3–5
times in [20].
Passive Attacks in NFC: Recent work on the design of
passive attacks, primarily in the context of wireless power
transfer, use the magneto-inductive (MI) principle [21], [22],
[23], [24]. There has been much work using the MI model to
3improve the relay systems. Theoretical optimization prob-
lems for interference zero-forcing beamforming [25], [26]
were formulated to analyze the optimal orientation and
distance of relays. Binary load and frequency tuning [22]
show an improvement of 35.6dB in the whole passive re-
laying system. Lagrangian multi-user approach [21] was
introduced and analyzed to obtain optimal orientations
maximizing received power. Other work adopted passive
relays in multiple applications. MagMIMO [27] designed
a multiple-input multiple-output beamforming system and
passive antennas attached to remote mobile phones, achiev-
ing a charging distance of 40 centimeters. MultiSpot [28] fo-
cused on multiple receivers, and beamformed the maximum
current by inferring the number of receivers.
Detecting Attacks: Mechanisms of detecting the poten-
tial attacks on NFC have also been widely studied. Recent
state-of-art work on detecting attacks in NFC fall into dis-
tance bounding [29], [30], [31]. A security framework of con-
tactless access control [31] considers the whole interaction
between components, transforming the distance boundaries
of access control to protect user privacy of NFC tags. Other
work also used ambient sensors [32], [33], [34] and security
middleware [35], [36], [37] to detect the malicious attack.
Seven ambient sensors were used in [33] to separate normal
and malicious transactions that may occur at the same time.
A security middleware is designed in [35] to recognize CPU
footprints with low latency less than a second. Further,
infrared light was also adopted to prevent relay attacks in
NFC [38].
Inspired by the models above, we build a practical
system, ReCoil, that designs passive relays to break the
guaranteed maximum communication distance. The total
communication distance between the reader and the at-
tacked card is enlarged to 49.6 cm using completely passive
components, an improvement of 10× over commercial NFC.
Why Passive? Our system focuses on physical attack
exploiting the design of completely passive relays. First,
ReCoil does not consume power given that its relay coils are
made from common copper wires and capacitors, making
our system a low-cost and energy-efficient one. Second, our
attack device can be relatively easily hidden without the
power supply or the batteries, which means that the attacker
can carries the attack device more stealthily when compared
to the active ones. Then, though active transmitters bring us
novel approaches to attack NFC, our system passively relays
the query and authentication signals of the commercial
reader over extended range without any active eavesdrop-
ping and data modification. Thus, it is relatively difficult to
localize our relays. Furthermore, ReCoil tackles the comple-
mentary problem of aiming to enlarge the communication
range of NFC cards without modifying the protocol. In the
absence of active transmissions, modifications to the radio
signal or changes to signal timing, these make ReCoil hard
to detect using previous work on NFC threat mitigation.
3 PRELIMINARIES
NFC has three modes of operation: the read/write mode,
card emulation mode and peer-to-peer mode. In the
read/write mode, an NFC device is used as a reader, com-
municating with the NFC tags. This mode is frequently
used in access control system or mobile payments. In the
card emulation mode, an NFC device acts as a passive card
and can communicate with NFC readers when it receives
enough energy to wake up. NFC smartphones operate in
peer-to-peer mode to share useful information, like the
contact lists or pictures between phones. In this paper, we
consider NFC tags working in card emulation mode (e.g.
payment cards or access cards) and a commercial reader
transmitting signals to NFC tags.
The NFC Protocol for Authentication: When processing
payments, an NFC reader keeps sending a query signal and
waiting for the response from NFC cards. Once the NFC
cards accumulate enough energy, they use load modulation
to decode the reader’s signal and then send a response
which includes a 16-bit random number and an ID number
(typically 4-7 bytes long). The payment process is authenti-
cated after a successful handshake between the card and the
reader.
Physics behind NFC: NFC tags use electromagnetic
induction to supply power to wake up NFC tag chips.
As Fig. 2 shows, the reader, powered by a power source
U0, transmits electric and magnetic energy through the coil
antenna. The coil antenna on the NFC tag then observes an
induced current and magnetic field due to mutual induc-
tance. The NFC tag has a typical LC parallel circuit.
The larger the amount of magnetic flux from the trans-
mitter’s coil that goes through the receiver’s coil, the larger
the induced current is at the receiver. To maximize induced
current, the coils are designed to be resonant at the NFC
frequencies (13.56 MHz) so that the inductance and capac-
itance: jωL and 1jωC cancel each other. We will find the
optimal distance between two coils so as to maximize the
mutual inductance between them.
Fig. 2: Electromagnetic induction in NFC.
The net separation between a pair of coils for the same
desired current at the receiver coil can be increased by using
additional coil relays, which enhance the MCR-WPT. Pas-
sive relays help guide magnetic flux more efficiently from
transmitter to receiver, allowing the receiver tag to receive
the same current from a much longer distance (see Fig. 3).
This model has an equivalent circuit to mathematically
calculate the mutual inductance. After obtaining the mutual
inductance, we can calculate the corresponding impedance
which can represent the coupling degree between two coils.
The rest of this paper relies on these principles to study
the effect of the human body, the coil design space (geome-
try, size, number of turns) as well as the circuit impedance
4Fig. 3: The MCR-WPT model.
to maximize power transfer in real-world NFC passive man-
in-the-middle attacks.
4 SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we introduce the attack model, and then
explain the challenges and the solutions in our system. Our
design in Sec. 5 is around these key challenges.
4.1 Attack Model
As Fig. 4 shows, our attack model consists of a reader, an
attacker equipped with the passive hacking device, and a
victim who carries an NFC card. Our hacking device is
composed of a half waist band and a backpack that contains
three coils. The waist band consists of two square coils and
HaBand. We use HaBand to reroute the signal pass over the
surface of the human body, and use the square coils to focus
the signal as much as possible. Then coils hidden in the
backpack is used to convey the magnetic power to a further
distance. When the attacker and the victim stand in the same
line in a shop, the attacker can wear the waist band and the
backpack to attack the NFC card of the person behind her.
Reader
Counter
Signal
Relay
attack
NFC card
Waist band
Backpack
Fig. 4: The attack model.
4.2 Challenges and Solutions
Challenge 1: In our system, we aim to enlarge the com-
munication range to attack the NFC cards by a wearable
device. Our main goal is to transmit the signal of the reader
to pass through the human body, and then to let the signal
converge at the back of the attacker. However, in order to do
so, we need to investigate how to determine the geometry
parameters (size, number of turns, distance, orientation) that
maximize the transmission range.
Solution 1: We formulate the problem to maximize the
output power in relation to the geometry parameters of
the relay coils. RACA is designed to find the optimum and
inform our design. Based on the algorithm, we choose a
square coil geometry that senses the magnetic field gener-
ated by the signal from the reader directly and maximizes
signal power relayed.
Challenge 2: After we design the optimal parameters to
relay the energy of the NFC reader, the fast-fading signal
from the reader is attenuated as it is transmitted through
these coils. In particular, the signal cannot pass through
the human body directly merely with the help of coupling,
resulting in a limited communication range. Further, we
observe that the distance that the coils can enlarge is not
proportional to the size of the relay coils. This brings about
the challenging problem of how to reroute the signal to
circumvent the human body and focus the magnetic power
towards the back of the body to the maximum extent possi-
ble.
Solution 2: To address Challenge 2, we design HaBand,
a big rectangular coil which is curved to fit the waist of
a human body. Since the magnetic and electric energy is
relayed, the signal is transmitted across HaBand towards
the back of the body. Therefore, HaBand effectively reroutes
the signal and most of the power to pass over the waist of
the human body, while also weakening the magnetic field
as little as possible. To improve range further, we build an
MCR-WPT system, where we place one of the square coils
in front of the human body to connect to HaBand and place
another square coil on the back of the human body. In this
way, the system can not only transmit the signal over the
surface of the human body, but also focus maximum energy
to the smaller coil on the back. In order to keep enlarging
the communication range in a certain direction, we build a
three-square-coil box which is hidden in a backpack based
on RACA.
Sec. 5 further elaborates the key challenges and solutions
in the system design. Sec. 5.1 proposes the RACA and search
the optimal parameters of the coils to solve Challenge 1.
Sec. 5.2 shows how we combine the coils and focus the
power to solve Challenge 2. Sec. 7 evaluates our design.
5 SYSTEM DESIGN
5.1 Coil Design
In this section, we first determine the shape of coils based
on analysis and simulations. Then we formulate the energy
transmission of the attack system, which can help us deter-
mine how to design the size and geometry of the passive
relays. Next, we design the RACA to obtain the optimal
geometry parameters.
5.1.1 Shape Determination
First, we compare the magnetic field strength generated
by the coil with different shapes. We assume that all the
types of coils are in the uniformly changing magnetic field,
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Fig. 5: The magnetic field of the: (a) square coil, (b) circular coil, (c) hexagonal coil, (d) octagonal coil.
and they have the same amount of magnetic flux (also the
same area). We investigate square, circular, hexagonal and
octagonal coils which are commonly used NFC antennas
[39] to observe how they affect the mutual inductance. Based
on their model of mutual inductance [40], [41], [42], though
a circular coil has the maximum magnetic flux among the
four types of coil, the energy transfer is related to the power
source and is always case-by-case. Thus, we simulate the
four coils in HFSS to investigate the magnetic field.
In order to simulate the reader PN532 (the commercial
reader we use in Sec. 6) in HFSS, we build a signal source
which has a rectangular coil antenna as PN532. Then, we
draw a square, circular, hexagonal and octagonal coil re-
spectively, and regulate them with the same parameters
to observe the performance. The magnetic field relayed by
these coils can be obtained, as Fig. 5 shows. We observe that
the magnetic field relayed by the square coil is larger than
that of the others. Therefore, square relay coils are adopted
in our system design.
5.1.2 Problem Formulation
Wireless power transfer (WPT) is recently a popular tech-
nology which is widely used in wireless charging and
other applications [43], [44], [45], [46]. Magnetically cou-
pled inductive (MCI)-WPT and MCR-WPT are two typical
techniques of WPT [47]. MCI-WPT has limited communi-
cation range, while MCR-WPT boosts longer distance with
high transmission efficiency. Therefore, MCR-WPT helps us
enlarge the communication range between the reader and
the card effectively. An MCR-WPT system which has a
serial circuit of transmitter, several serial circuits of resonate
passive relays and a parallel circuit of receiver is defined
as a Serial-Serial-Parallel (SSP) MCR-WPT system. Since the
NFC card has a parallel circuit, the reader-relay-card system
we design is an SSP MCR-WPT system, and the equivalent
circuit is shown in Fig. 6.
In the system, we assume that we need n passive relays
to enlarge the communication range. Ik(k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n})
represents the current of relay #k, shown in Eqn. 1. Rk rep-
resents the corresponding resistance, and Zk represents the
equivalent impedance. Table 1 shows the symbols we define
in ReCoil. ω is the angular frequency and ω = 2pif , f is
the resonate frequency (13.56 MHz) of NFC, M12 represents
the mutual inductance between relay #1 and #2, and so on.
M(in)(1) is the mutual inductance between the NFC reader
and the relay #1. M(n)(o) is the mutual inductance between
relay #n and the NFC card. The equivalent impedance due
to the mutual inductance can be defined in Eqn. 2, where
Zin is the input impedance of NFC reader, Ro is the output
load of the NFC card.
I1 =
ω2M(in)(1)Iin
R1 + Z1
I2 =
ω2M12I1
R2 + Z2
· · ·
In =
ω2M(n−1)(n)In−1
Rn + Zn
Io =
M(n)(o)In
Lo
(1)

Zn =
M(n)(o)Ro
L2o
Zn−1 =
ω2M2(n−1)(n)
Zn +Rn
· · ·
Z1 =
ω2M212
Z2 +R2
Zin =
ω2M2(in)(1)
Z1
(2)
The output power Po is defined as
Po = I
2
oRo (3)
where the I2o is the current that passes through the load. The
energy transmission efficiency can be defined as
η =
Po
Pin
(4)
where Pin = (Zin + Lin)I2in.
Two coils that are put together is always with lateral, ax-
ial and angular misalignment [41]. The model of mutual in-
ductance is M = 2N1N2µ0pi
√
S1S2
∫ pi
0
[
cos θ− dS2 cosφ
]
Ψ(k)
k
√
V 3
dφ,
where S1 and S2 represent half the side length of two
adjacent square coils, N1 and N2 represent the number of
turns of the two coils. α = S2S1 , β =
c
S1
, ξ = β−α cosφ sin θ,
k2 = 4αV(1+αV )2+ξ2 , Ψ(k) =
(
1− k22
)
K(k) − E(k),
V =
√
1− cos2 φ sin2 θ − 2 dRS cosφ cos θ + d
2
S22
, K(k) =
6Fig. 6: The equivalent circuit of multiple coils in SSP MCR-WPT.
∫ pi
2
0
1√
1−k2 sin2 θ
dθ, E(k) =
∫ pi
2
0
√
1− k2 sin2 θdθ. We ob-
serve that the model of mutual inductance depends on the
lateral misalignment d, the axial misalignment c, and the
angular misalignment θ. Next we use Sk(k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n})
to represent the side length of relay #k. Nk is the corre-
sponding number of turns. Sin is the side length of the NFC
reader, and So is the side length of the NFC card. Nin is the
number of turns of the NFC reader, while No is the number
of turns of the NFC card. We define d0, · · · , dn respectively
to represent the lateral misalignment between any adjacent
two coils of the n + 2 coils (NFC reader, NFC card, and
n relays). Besides, c0, · · · , cn and θ0, · · · , θn also represent
the corresponding axial and angular misalignment. We also
define all the above symbols in Table 1.
Based on the models above, in our problem, we maxi-
mize the output power of this coil system in Eqn. 5 below:
max Po (5)
s.t.

ηn > η0
Iin < I0
Sk 6 S0
(6)
According to Eqn. 6, in order to guarantee the signal
transmission, the transmission efficiency ηn when we use n
relays should be equal to or larger than the threshold η0.
Besides, due to the power constraint of FCC, the current of
the NFC reader should be less than the threshold I0. Further,
due to the area constraint of human body, Sk should be
equal to or less than the threshold S0.
This optimization problem is formulated as a nonlinear
programming, which is non-convex and includes extensive
nonlinear constraints. We cannot map our problem to an
underlying convex problem and adopt convex optimization
methods directly. Conducting the nonlinear programming
solvers will bring about largely local optimum. Considering
that parameter settings under experiments could be step by
step, we try to analyze feasible regions and narrow them
down as much as possible. Then we design RACA which
will be introduced as follows to solve this problem.
5.1.3 ReCoil-Ant Colony Algorithm
Ant Colony Algorithm (ACA) is a heuristic algorithm that
is inspired by the pheromone trail laying and following
TABLE 1: Notations
Symbol Definition
n The number of relays
k Relay #k (k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n})
Ik The current of relay #k
Iin The input current on the NFC reader
Io The output current on the NFC card
Rk The resistance of relay #k
Ro The output load of the NFC card
Zk The equivalent impedance of relay #k
Zin The input impedance of NFC reader
Lin The inductance of the NFC reader
Lo The inductance of the NFC card
Nin The number of turns of the NFC reader
Nk The number of turns of relay #k
No The number of turns of the NFC card
Sk The side length of relay #k
Sin The side length of the NFC reader
So The side length of the NFC card
f The resonate frequency
ω The angular frequency ω = 2pif
M12 The mutual inductance between relay #1 and #2
M(in)(1)
The mutual inductance between
the NFC reader and relay #1
M(n)(o)
The mutual inductance between
relay #n and the NFC card
Pin The input power
Po The output power
d0, · · · , dn The lateral misalignment between two adjacent coils
c0, · · · , cn The axial misalignment between two adjacent coils
θ0, · · · , θn The angular misalignment between two adjacent coils
ηn The transmission efficiency when we use n relays
7behavior of some ant species [48]. Artificial ants find the
best path by sensing the density of the pheromone left by
the ant colony. Inspired by this, we design RACA to obtain
the optimal parameters that maximize the output power.
We first divide the feasible areas into several scatter sets,
narrowing down the feasible areas by taking account for real
experiments. For example, we do not have to fix the iteration
step 1 mm, since 1 mm is negligible in real life. In order to
reduce the computational complexity, n should increase step
by step, so we treat it as an initial parameter. In RACA,
we initiate the corresponding geometric parameters, the
number of iterations T , the volatilization coefficients ρ, the
transition probability set Q0 and the searching area set A.
Then, the randomly chosen parameters are input to calculate
the initial ReCoil pheromone τ which describes the contri-
bution to maximize the output power. The parameters with
larger output power are given larger transition probability.
We calculate the output power and update the parameters
based on transition probability every loop. Algorithm 1
shows the details. Pn∗o is defined as the maximum output
power when we use n relays (n = 1, 2, 3, · · · ), and we
use ηn to represent the transmission efficiency when we
use n relays. The local optimum can be avoided through
T iterations.
Algorithm 1 ReCoil-Ant Colony Algorithm
Initiate Pn∗o = 0, n = 1, 2, 3, · · · , T, ρ,Q0,A
. Initialize the parameters
Input: Sk, Nk, d0, · · · , dn, c0, · · · , cn, θ0, · · · , θn
. Input parameters in feasible areas
Output: S∗k , Nk, d
∗
0, · · · , d∗n, c∗0, · · · , c∗n, θ∗0 , · · · , θ∗n
. Optimal parameters to maximize the output power
Loop:
1: τ = CALfun(ρ,Q0,A)
. Calculate the initial pheromone
2: while ηn > η0, Iin < I0, Sk 6 S0, iteration times 6 T
do
3: Calculate Pno
4: if Pno > P
n∗
o
5: Pn∗o = P
n
o
. Search the maximum output power
6: end if
7: Update Sk, Nk, d0, · · · , dn, c0, · · · , cn, θ0, · · · , θn
8: Update τ = (1− ρ)× τ + CALfun(ρ,Q0,A)
9: end while
10: S∗k ← Sk
11: N∗k ← Nk
12: d∗0, · · · , d∗n ← d0, · · · , dn
13: c∗0, · · · , c∗n ← c0, · · · , cn
14: θ∗0 , · · · , θ∗n ← θ0, · · · , θn
We observe that the value of mutual inductance keeps
dropping when the angular misalignment increases, thus
when the two coils are parallel, the largest mutual induc-
tance is obtained. Moreover, when the lateral misalignment
increases, the mutual inductance between the two coils
drops first and gradually increases to almost 0. With the ax-
ial misalignment increases, the mutual inductance reduces
(a) (b)
Fig. 7: (a) The return loss S11 under 51pF. (b) The prototype
of the square coil.
and approaches to 0.
We then tune the side length, the number of turns, the
lateral, axial, and angular misalignment to study the output
power. With the side length, the number of turns, or the
axial misalignment of the square coils increasing, the output
power increases first and then drops gradually. Further, the
output power is inversely proportional to the lateral and
angular misalignment. When the lateral misalignment is
equal to 0 and the axial misalignment is equal to half the side
length of the square coil, we have the largest output power.
As a consequence, we build the square coils 10 cm×10 cm
with three turns and a separation of two-millimeter between
every two copper wires.
After we obtain the optimal parameters, we then build
the model in HFSS and regulate the capacitor. We change
the capacitor’s capacitance progressively from 10 pF to
90 pF. Initially, With the capacitance increasing, the return
loss increases and has a peak at 51 pF. Then it gradually
drops when the capacitance keeps increasing. Such a result
validates that the coil can transmit the largest magnetic
power at the resonant frequency 13.56 MHz, as Fig. 7(a)
shows.
f =
1
2pi
√
LC
. (7)
We design our prototype by using copper wires and
capacitors, shown as Fig. 7(b). Based on Eqn. 7 and exten-
sive experiments, we match a capacitance of 60 pF for the
system to achieve the largest distance expanded. Taking into
account that the commercial capacitors have a 10% error, the
difference of results among the analysis, the simulation and
the real coils can be acceptable.
5.2 Coil Combination
5.2.1 HaBand Design
Since the signal cannot go through the human body directly,
we build HaBand which has a dimension of 10 cm×30 cm.
It also has three turns and a two-millimeter separation
between every two copper wires. We match the appropriate
capacitance to it based on Eqn. 7. Then, we change its
curvature to match the curvature of human waist.
After we manually build the 10 cm×10 cm square coils
and the 10 cm×30 cm HaBand, we combine them and
build an MCR-WPT system, focusing the signal at the back
of the human body as much as possible. When two coils
8horizontally laying in the same plane couple each other
too close, one of them is the source of interference to
the other, weakening the whole magnetic fields. When we
gradually separate the two coils in the same plane, the
coupled magnetic field would increase first and then drop.
The parameters that describe the combined magnitude of
the magnectic field in HFSS also validate this observation.
We also evaluate this result by using Universal Software
Radio Peripheral (USRP) in Sec. 7. Indeed, this is the reason
why we need a small square coil to absorb the energy
from the NFC reader, before we use HaBand and another
small square coil. Together, our approach focuses the signal
and magnetic power in the desired direction around the
attacker’s body.
In order to obtain the whole optimization in our sys-
tem, it is important to make sure that every coil has the
best performance. Considering that there are some errors
among different coils and different capacitors, we use the
tunable capacitors which can be effortlessly hand-tuned to
be matched to every unique coil.
5.2.2 Backpack design
After converging the signal at the back of the human body
and regulating the optimal value of capacitors, we want to
find the best way to keep the signal transmitting farther.
Thus more coils need to be added to this system. As we
know from Sec. 5.1, when we gradually separate two coils,
the magnetic power increases first and reaches a peak, then
it finally drops. We add three more coils based on the
optimal distance between two coils we obtain. We also test
the performance by changing the distance in HFSS. The
results show that the two-coil system has a better perfor-
mance when the distance is between 5 cm and 6 cm, which
validates the analysis in Sec. 5.1. In Sec. 7, we introduce how
we evaluate this range improvement using a software radio.
Fig. 8: The ReCoil simulation model in HFSS.
Orientation can also impacts the generated magnetic
field. In order to verify the optimal orientation of the coils
that we put in the backpack, we change the orientation of
the coils in HFSS model. The system is expected to get the
optimal performance when the two coils totally face each
other. This result is consistent with that in Sec. 5.1. We let
the distance between the two coils be 5 cm and change
the orientation parameter of the second coil from 0 deg
to 180 deg. When the orientation parameter is 0 deg, the
system can generate the largest magnetic field. In Sec. 7,
we also use USRP to evaluate our system performance
by changing the orientation of coils. After we obtain the
optimal distance between the coils and the orientation of
the coils, a backpack is used to hide the additional three
coils. As a consequence, more distance enlargement to hack
people’s cards can be achieved.
Based on the results above, we build our attack system
in HFSS to observe the transmission process of the magnetic
field. As Fig. 8 shows, the small rectangle in front of the
whole model acts as the commercial reader which generates
magnetic signals. Then, we introduce our system which
consists of the square coils and HaBand. Another three
square coils hidden in the backpack keep delivering the
signal and energy far away from the band. We introduce
several cross-sectional planes across the model to see the
transmission process of the magnetic power. Column(a) in
Fig. 9 illustrates the magnetic field around the square coil
beside the reader. Column(b) introduces that the magnetic
field generated by the square coil is gradually weaker and
largely transmitted on HaBand. From Column(c), the mag-
netic field begins to converge on the square coils behind
HaBand. In summary, the magnetic field is first absorbed
by the square coil in front of the human body, and then it
is transmitted by HaBand. It finally converges towards the
coils in the backpack. These results validate our analysis
from before.
Fig. 9: The cross-sectional planes of the magnetic field in
ReCoil system.
6 IMPLEMENTATION
We build the testbed that consists of a reader, an attacker
equipped with ReCoil, and a victim who carries an NFC
card. Our testbed is built in a 4.5 m×4.5 m office area,
shown as Fig. 1. We place the PN532 NFC reader which
is connected to a personal computer (PC) through the serial
port on the desk. PN532 NFC shield is attached to Arduino
through I2C interface. One person acts as the attacker, and
the other who holds NFC cards acts as the victim. The waist
band is worn on the attacker’s waist and the three-coil box is
hidden in a backpack. Through the serial port software, the
PC on the desk reads the information about the hacked card,
including its unique ID and whether it can be authenticated
or not.
9Fig. 10 shows the design of the attack device. It is com-
posed of the waist band and the three-coil box placed into
the backpack. All the coils are fixed on acrylic plates which
do not introduce interference. HaBand has a dimension of
10 cm×30 cm, while the square coils have a dimension
of 10 cm×10 cm. We make HaBand curved by hot-melt
technique to fit around the human body’s waist. In order
to guarantee the largest magnetic field, we regulate every
tunable capacitors to achieve the best performance of the
device. Fig. 10(b) also shows our design on the box we put
into the the backpack. From the results in Sec. 5, we first set
the distance of every two of the square coils 5 cm. Then, we
make every two of them totally face each other, i.e., we set
the orientation 0 deg.
In our system, we conduct five types of experiments.
(1) Experiments of two-coil system. We build two square
coils by using copper wires and capacitors. In this two-coil
system, we deploy USRP to catch the received power. The
distance between the two coils, the distance between the
NFC tag and the last coil, and the orientation of the coils
are changed during the process. We compare the results and
optimize the parameters. (2) Experiments of the number of
coils. We arrange the centroid of the square coils be in a
straight line (like dominoes), and investigate the farthest
distance that our system can enlarge by simply adding more
square coils to our system. (3) Impacts of human body. We
deploy our whole testbed on a human body to find the
impact of the human body on the received power. We then
deploy the Ferrite board on the human body to investigate
the impacts on the whole distance. (4) Experiments amidst
multipath. We evaluate the impacts of clothing and the
impacts of multiple cards on the performance. Besides,
considering the interference from the moving people, we
add interference from iron plates, mobile phones and keys to
our system to test the robustness of ReCoil. (5) Experiments
on commercial smartphones. We adopt commercial NFC-
based smartphones as the commercial readers to test the
feasibility of our system.
7 EVALUATION
In this section, we use USRP to validate the results we
obtain in Sec. 5 and Sec. 6. We use the USRP with the DLP
radio frequency identification (RFID) antenna to listen to the
real signal from the reader PN532. The DLP RFID antenna
also works at a frequency of 13.56MHz. This USRP system
provides us the received normalized voltage to describe the
energy transfer. We first use these devices to listen to the
signal generated by the reader and the response from the
NFC card. We find that when the normalized voltage is
larger than 0.22, the card can always decode the query signal
from the reader and send the response.
7.1 Two-coil System
We let two coils totally face each other and change the
distance between them. We bind the DLP RFID antenna and
the second coil together, minimizing the distance between
the DLP RFID antenna and the second coil. From the results
in Fig. 11, when the distance between the two coils is around
5 cm (half the side length of the coils), the normalized
(a) (b)
Fig. 10: (a) The waist band. (b) The three coils put into the
backpack.
voltage received by the DLP RFID antenna reaches the peak,
which means that the second coil can relay the largest power
when the distance is 5 cm. The result is consistent with that
of the analysis and simulation. We observe that the farthest
communication distance is 16 cm in Fig. 11. Further, we fix
the distance between the two coils 16 cm, and use the DLP
RFID antenna as an NFC card. We slowly move the DLP
RFID antenna far away from the second coil. As Fig. 12
shows, when the card moves, the received power reaches
a peak at the distance of 4 cm, then it begins to decrease.
That is to say, the second coil cuts the maximum magnetic
lines and generates the maximum magnetic field at 4 cm.
We observe that the error of normalized voltage in Fig. 11
is larger than that Fig. 12. This stems from the reason that
the DLP RFID antenna is being too close to the second relay
coil in Fig. 11 and brings more interference to our system.
When we fix the distance between the two coils 16 cm, we
add the third relay coil to this two-coil system and find that
the NFC card cannot respond to the reader anymore. This
verifies our analysis that the distance between two adjacent
coils should be fixed to maximize the power transfer.
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Fig. 11: The received voltage vs. the distance between two
coils.
We then place two coils horizontally in the same plane,
and we fix the distance between the card and the coils to
4 cm. We progressively move one of the coils horizontally
in the plane and observe the received normalized voltage.
Shown as Fig. 13, when the 10 cm side of the two coils are
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Fig. 12: The received voltage vs. the distance between the
tag and the last coil.
precisely next to each other, we define the distance as 0 cm.
The distance is positive when the two coils become apart,
and the distance is negative when they overlap. When the
distance between the two sides of the coils is 0 cm, the
system has the best performance. This is the reason why
we compactly attach the square coils and HaBand.
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Fig. 13: The received voltage vs. the distance between the
two sides of the coils.
In order to evaluate the orientation (angular misalign-
ment) of the coils, we change the orientation of one of
the two coils. Considering that we need enough space to
rotate the second coil, we set a distance of 18 cm between
the first coil and the second coil. When the two coils are
totally parallel, we define the orientation of the second coil
as 0 deg. When we rotate the second coil counterclockwise,
the orientation is defined to be negative. The orientation
is defined to be positive when the second coil is rotated
clockwise. As Fig. 14 shows, the received voltage has a peak
at the orientation of 0 deg. This means that we have the
maximum mutual inductance at 0 deg, which validates the
results in Sec. 5. The error shown in Fig. 14 is within 10−4.
We observe that there are two valleys in Fig. 14. Since we
do not consider the dynamic variability of the magnetic flux
in the analysis, the second coil cuts the minimum magnetic
field lines under -70 deg or 70 deg in the real experiment.
Then the second coil cuts more magnetic field lines, making
the energy increase when the angular misalignment is larger
than 70 deg or less than -70 deg.
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Fig. 14: The received voltage vs. the orientation of the coils.
7.2 The Number of coils
Then, we evaluate that how the number of coils impacts the
attack distance when we arrange the centroid of the relay
coils to be in a straight line (like dominoes). We deploy every
two of the coils with a distance of 5 cm, because the NFC
card receives the largest energy under the circumstances.
Then, we fix a distance of 4 cm between the reader and the
first relay coil, and a distance of 4 cm between the NFC
card and the last coil. As Fig. 15 shows, the communication
distance rises to 54 cm till we have 11 coils. We observe once
the number of coils is larger than 11, the NFC card cannot
wake up and respond anymore. Thus, a distance of 54 cm
can be obtained when 11 coils are arranged in a straight
line. Since we obtain the best distance between two adjacent
coils to maximize the output power, we keep adding the
coils every 5 cm. As we know from Sec. 7.1, when we keep
the maximum communication distance every time we add a
new coil, the signal stops at the third coil. Therefore, we do
not select the maximum communication range every time.
This is the reason why the curve in Fig. 15 is almost linear
before the eleventh coil is added. However, the energy is
attenuated during the process of adding more coils. After
we add the twelfth coil, the NFC card does not respond
anymore.
7.3 Human Body
We evaluate the distance between the NFC card and the
backpack when we add the three-coil box to the system,
shown as Fig. 16. We find that the distance that the device
worn on human body can reach is 7 cm, while the distance
of the device without human body is 8 cm. From the
beginning, the energy around human body keeps dropping,
this stems from the reason that the human body changes
the energy transfer and as a result, changes the position
of the maximum power. Then, the received voltage with
human body is generally smaller than that without human
body. Therefore, human bodies have the impact on the
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Fig. 15: The communication distance vs. the number of
coils.
performance of the whole system, impairing the attack
distance and moving the maximum point of received power.
Compared to the communication range of existing NFC
systems, our system can still achieve a large enlargement
in range.
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Fig. 16: The distance between the tag and the backpack
with/without human body.
7.4 Impact of Multipath
In commercial scenarios, when the attacker and the victim
are standing in the same line, there would be complex
multipath due to movement in the environment, like a
few people passing by or other people in the line bringing
mobile phones. Therefore, in order to evaluate the stability
of ReCoil, we try to simulate these situations, adding more
external multipath to our system.
We first deploy some iron plates around ReCoil and
measure the whole distance between the reader and the
NFC card. Table 2 shows that ReCoil can still has an attack
distance of 48.3 cm. Then, when we place some smartphones
around the band and the backpack, ReCoil can still reach a
communication distance of 48.2 cm. When we place a set of
keys around, the whole distance between the reader and the
NFC card is 48 cm. Though the metallic materials do have
some impacts on ReCoil, the results show the robustness of
our system.
TABLE 2: The communication distance vs. different types
of interference
Interference NoInterference
Iron
plates Smartphones Keys
Communication
distance (cm) 48.5 48.3 48.2 48
Based on the results above, we obtain the good per-
formance on accessing the victim’s NFC card. However,
the people who carry some metallic objects would bring
about some degree of interference and affect the power
that received by the hacked cards. In order to mitigate the
impact of interference from the metallic objects, we evaluate
if the Ferrite board can lessen the interference. We put a
piece of Ferrite board on the attacker’s body before she
wears the waist band on. After we use the Ferrite board, the
total communication distance can be enlarged to 49.6 cm,
as Fig. 17 shows. Therefore, the Ferrite material can partly
reduce the interference. We also evaluate the performance
when the victim puts the card into his pocket or he just
holds it by hand to observe the impact of clothing. We
observe that the user’s clothing does have the impact on the
communication distance. When the card is in the pocket, the
whole distance reduces more than 1 cm. Further, the error is
stable within 1 cm, showing the stability of our system.
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Fig. 17: The whole distance between the reader and the
card when the card is in the hand/pocket with/without
Ferrite board.
We also evaluate that if our system can attack cards
successfully when the victim has more than one cards.
Shown in Table 3, we find that the whole distance keeps
decreasing with a stable error when the number of cards
increases. This stems from the reason that a more-coil sys-
tem divides the energy from the NFC reader into several
parts, forcing a longer delay from the coils in response to the
reader. As Fig. 18 shows, when the victim has two or three
NFC cards, our system can still attack one of them. After
extensive experiments, the results show that the three cards
are randomly chosen to be attacked. In our system, if any
one of the cards that the victim has is attacked, our system
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is regarded as hacking an NFC card successfully, i.e., ReCoil
can still hack cards when there are collisions happening.
TABLE 3: The communication distance vs. multiple cards
Number of
cards one two three
Communication
distance (cm) 48.5 45.6 40.5
1 card 2 cards 3 cards
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Fig. 18: The success rate of different card when there are
multiple cards in the system.
TABLE 4: The communication distance vs. different
smartphones
Smartphone HUAWEIMate9 Xiaomi6
SAMSUNG Galaxy
A9 Star
Communication
distance (cm) 40 42 48
7.5 Case Study
We also use different types of commercial smartphones to
act as commercial readers and read NFC cards. As Ta-
ble 4 shows, we use HUAWEI Mate9, Xiaomi6, SAMSUNG
Galaxy A9 Star to evaluate the whole communication dis-
tance from these readers and the NFC card. The commu-
nication distance between the readers and the card in our
system can still be over than 40 cm, which validates that
ReCoil can be effectively used in commercial scenarios.
8 DISCUSSIONS
Though ReCoil coils are designed to be relatively inflexible,
minute shape changes of the array can cause the resonant
frequency to easily change, impacting the performance of
the relays. In addition, our system can be affected by all-
metal objects, like mobile phones or keys. Besides, the
commercial readers or the passive tags should be opposite to
one of the coils, ensuring as much magnetic flux as possible
passes through the coil, and the tag receive the largest
power. Thus in this section, we explain our limitations and
future work.
Reducing the interference. Though the evaluation
shows the robustness of our system, the system can still
experience interference that absorbs the magnetic energy.
Once the people around the attacker carry some metal
objects, it will slightly effect the whole performance. Fur-
thermore, when we put a smartphone face the last coil in the
backpack or face the commercial reader oppositely, the NFC
card behind the smartphone cannot be activated anymore.
Therefore, if the victim places a mobile phone and an NFC
card together when he stands in the line, our system cannot
attack the card anymore. At this time, the attacker needs to
find a new victim. Thus, how to relieve the interference from
smartphones or how to hack the NFC-based smartphones
directly would be potential problems in the future.
Improving the robustness. As shown in Sec. 5 and Sec. 7,
the NFC cards in our system should totally face the last
coil in the backpack, because the cards can largely receive
the magnetic power under the circumstances. We find that
there is a tradeoff between the width and the length of the
attacking area. Since we need to use the small square coil to
focus the magnetic field to a certain direction, the range of
attacking width is very limited. However, we have no prior
knowledge on the location of the victim, weakening our
success rate of attack. We will consider algorithms of blind
search in the future to make our system more sustainable.
Resolving the collisions. Though our system can attack
the NFC cards when the victim has three cards or more, the
attacking distance is undermined when more NFC cards
are added to ReCoil. The several cards suffer magnetic
interference when they are put together, resulting in limited
power for them to wake up. Collision resolution involves
the optimization of anti-collision protocol, thus, using USRP
to operate NFC protocols and optimizing the anti-collision
mechanism should be essential to solve this problem.
9 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we design the system, ReCoil to attack
the NFC cards by using passive relays. Unlike prior
work, which required power consumption, our approach is
battery-free and effortless for the attacker to wear. Instead
of modifying the protocol of NFC readers, we transmit
the signal of commercial NFC readers far away by passive
relays, making our system stealthy and hard to be located.
After designing the algorithm to search the optimal coil
parameters, we build an MCR-WPT system. The waist band
and the three-coil box put into the backpack can boost the
communication range of NFC hacking. We attach tunable
capacitors on these coils to match the unique inductance of
different coils. Meanwhile, we use Ferrite board to reduce
interference. Through extensive experiments, the farthest
distance ReCoil can achieve is 49.6 cm, which is as much as
ten times the communication distance of the existing NFC
system. ReCoil is compatible with commercial smartphones,
achieving a distance over 40 cm. Further, when the victim
has several NFC cards together, ReCoil can still randomly
select one and attack it successfully.
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